Five years ago, on August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul – the capital city of Afghanistan and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. The government of Afghanistan collapsed. The summer of 2021 had seen the quick advance of Taliban forces across the country. This general offensive began in the spring as the U.S. was winding down its nearly twenty years of involvement in the long Afghan conflict, withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, and significantly scaling back support to the Kabul regime.
By early August 2021, the few remaining U.S. military forces in Afghanistan were concentrated in Kabul at the Hamid Karzai International Airport – frequently referred to as HKIA. As the Taliban was making its approach to Kabul, the U.S. began a hasty non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to transport U.S. citizens, contractors, diplomats, Legal Permanent Residents, and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants. Other nations joined in the evacuation operation – providing transport out of Afghanistan to their citizens as well. (The daily events of the period of August 14-31, 2021 are noted here)
The airport was overwhelmed with Afghans seeking to flee Afghanistan and get on board the flights taking evacuees out of the country. Chaos ensued as Afghans flooded onto the HKIA airstrip. The U.S. military, along with elite Afghan security forces, restored control over the airport and flights were resumed.
As the evacuation proceeded, numerous volunteer organizations formed during the evacuation, bringing together individuals from varied backgrounds to help U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, former Afghan interpreters, and other at-risk Afghans leave the country. These Afghans served the U.S. military for many years as interpreters, workers, or contractors in Afghanistan. The Afghans were at risk of reprisals from the Taliban and they were desperate to leave Afghanistan.
The Doha Agreement negotiated by the Trump administration set the withdrawal in motion. In the Doha Agreement the United States agreed to withdraw all forces by May 2021, subject to Taliban commitments in the agreement being met. The Afghan government was not a party to the agreement. As part of the agreement, thousands of Taliban prisoners were released and the U.S. agreed to conduct an initial reduction of military personnel to 8,600. Many national security observers believed that the agreement weakened the Afghan government and contributed to uncertainty within the Afghan security forces. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) later concluded in a report [1] that the decision to withdraw U.S. forces was the most important immediate factor in the collapse of the Afghans security forces. However, the corruption and inability of the Afghan security institutions to support the Afghan military units doing the fighting on the ground was a major factor as well.
By January 2021, the U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan had fallen to approximately 2,500. In April, President Biden announced that the remaining forces would leave, initially setting September 11, 2021 as the deadline instead of May 2021. The deadline was subsequently moved to August 31. Bagram Airfield was transferred to Afghan control on July 2 with the remaining U.S. military presence was concentrated in Kabul, principally at HKIA and in support of the embassy. Along with the military personnel, American contractors and maintenance personnel were withdrawn. Afghan forces had depended heavily on American intelligence, logistics, air support, aircraft maintenance, medical evacuation, and resupply. The withdrawal of U.S. forces and contractors severely reduced the Afghan military’s ability to supply, maintain, reinforce, and medically evacuate isolated units.
The Taliban general offensive gathered momentum in the spring and summer of 2021. The Taliban first concentrated in the rural districts – taking over border crossings, blocking highways, and overrunning isolated government positions. Local government officials and military commanders at the district level negotiated surrenders to the Taliban. Of course, for several years, the Taliban had control of many of the rural districts. Those district centers that did not surrender were soon overrun due to a lack of personnel reinforcements, ammunition, food, medical evacuation, and air support. Afghan commandos continued fighting in several locations and frequently deployed to rescue conventional units. However, the commandos were not supported once deployed to far-flung locations.
By the beginning of August 2021, provincial capitals began to fall or surrender to the Taliban in rapid succession. On August 6, Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz province, fell to the Taliban, then Sheberghan on August 7, followed by Kunduz, Sar-e Pul, and Taloqan on August 8. Over the next several days the major cities of Herat, Ghazni, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Mazar-e Sharif, and Jalalabad fell. Although U.S. officials anticipated further deterioration—and some assessments warned that Kabul could eventually fall—the collapse of the provincial capitals over approximately eleven days occurred far faster than the U.S. expected.
The American position in Kabul became precarious. The embassy had continued operating in Kabul even as the security situation deteriorated. In post-August analysis most observers fault the Department of State for not beginning the NEO sooner than it did. Many observers felt that the NEO should have occurred using Bagram Airbase. The Pentagon sent more troops into HKIA to secure the airport and provide security for the evacuation. On August 14 the U.S. Department of State declared the non-combatant evacuation operation. The embassy evacuation was accelerated, moving personnel from the embassy grounds to HKIA by helicopter. The State Department’s after-action review (Sep 2023) acknowledged shortcomings in planning for worst-case scenarios. [2]
On August 15 President Ghani fled Afghanistan, the Afghan security forces abandoned many of its defensive positions in and around Kabul, and elements of the Taliban entered the capital and occupied government buildings. Desperate Afghans who worked for the U.S. military and other international organizations converged on the Kabul airport seeking an escape from the Taliban. At this point civilian flight operations ceased as the airport was overrun by Afghans seeking escape.
Photo: A Danish coalition service member holds up a Danish flag to identify families during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan, Aug. 21. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Victor Mancilla)
The Kabul NEO was centered on the Kabul airport located just to the north of the city. U.S. forces secured the military runway and facilities located on the northern side of HKIA and restored flight operations. Several entrances to the airport were secured by military personnel as thousands of Afghans attempted entry. Some were allowed access if they had the right connections or documents proving U.S. citizenship, LPR status, or Special Immigrant Visa status. The evacuees departed on military flights provided by the U.S. and other countries as well as on some contracted commercial aircraft. They were flown to temporary transit locations—often called ‘lily pads’ – to Qatar, Germany, Kuwait, and UAE, and elsewhere. More than 120,000 people were evacuated by the United States and other nations.
On August 26, an ISIS-K suicide bomber attacked Abbey Gate at HKIA, killing 13 U.S. service members and approximately 170 Afghan civilians. The final U.S. military flight took place on August 30.
Many volunteer organizations formed during this Kabul NEO to assist in the evacuation. The veterans, former government officials, nonprofit organizations, and private citizens tried to assist AMCITS, LPRs, Afghan interpreters, commandos, and their families to reach and gain entrance to HKIA for a flight out of Afghanistan. This loose coalition of volunteers became known as the “Digital Dunkirk”. Some of the more active groups were Task Force Dunkirk, No One Left Behind, Allied Airlift 21, and Team America Relief. The volunteers, working out of home offices or in their workplace, used WhatsApp, Signal, Slack, cell phones, and online chat groups to coordinate with each other, with Afghans, and with points of contact with the military or State Department at HKIA. Maps of HKIA, photographs, visual recognition signals, and more were exchanged in these forums and groups.
Five years later, the fall of Afghanistan is remembered as a major strategic failure. Numerous studies, reports, and books have examined the reasons for the collapse of the U.S.-supported Afghan government and security forces. Nevertheless, the Kabul NEO was marked by extraordinary personal courage and became the largest noncombatant evacuation airlift in U.S. history. For many U.S. military veterans who served in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, the events of August 2021 remain deeply personal—an experience some characterize as a moral injury. [3] Although many volunteer groups formed during the evacuation have since disbanded or reduced their activities, organizations such as #AfghanEvac continue working to fulfill the United States’ moral obligation to interpreters and other Afghans who supported the American mission.
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References:
1. “SIGAR Report: Collapse of Afghan Security Forces”, Afghan Report, February 27, 2023.
2. “OIGs Review of the Department of State’s Evacuation of the U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan”, AUD-MERO-23-33, September 2023.
3. “Moral injury and moral recovery”, by Joan Barker, Stars and Stripes, July 13, 2022.
4. #AfghanEvac is an umbrella organization that continues the work to assist in the relocations of Afghans who worked for the U.S. military and in support of the United States.
5. Congressional Hearing on the Emergency Evacuation from Afghanistan, March 8, 2023, PDF, 439 pages.
https://www.congress.gov/118/chrg/CHRG-118hhrg51854/CHRG-118hhrg51854.pdf
Maps: Derived from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) maps.